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ABSTRACT 
Flight and mission-critical systems are veri- 
fied, qualified for flight, and validated using well- 
known and well-established techniques. These 
techniques define the  validation methodology used 
for such systems. In order t o  verify, qualify, 
and validate knowledge-based systems (KBSs), 
the methodology used for conventional systems 
must be  addressed, and the applicability and limi- 
tations of tha t  methodology t o  KBSs must be iden- 
tified. The  author  presents a n  outline of how this 
approach t o  the validation of KBSs is being de- 
veloped and used a t  the Dryden Flight Research 
Facility of the NASA Ames Research Center. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The verification and validation (V&V) of 
flight-critical systems is a major activity at the 
Dryden Flight Research Facility of the NASA 
Ames Research Center (Ames-Dryden). The 
Ames-Dryden staff assumes safety-of-flight re- 
sponsibilities for all vehicles flown at the facility. 
Because these systems are used in research air- 
craft, the  V&V experience a t  Ames-Dryden is pri- 
marily with one-of-a-kind research systems on ex- 
perimental vehicles. While the range of this expe- 
rience a t  Ames-Dryden is somewhat more narrow 
than tha t  of the validation of flight-critical sys- 
tems for commercial operations [I], this experience 
is directly applicable to the types of knowledge- 
based systems (KBSs) within NASA research pro- 
grams, whose requirements are to  qualify and val- 
idate unique, one-of-a-kind research systems. 
The  Ames-Dryden VBV methodology for em- 
bedded flight-critical systems relies on testing, 
peer review, abstract models, simulations, and 
flight validation. This methodology also relies, in 
large part ,  on engineering judgment and a tradi- 
tion tha t  has evolved from the experience with 
flight-critical systems from the first simplex dig- 
ital aircraft flight control system on the F-8 dig- 
ital fly-by-wire (DFBW) aircraft [2], through the 
triplex D F B W  system on the F-8 aircraft [3,4], 
the  3/8th scale F-15 remotely piloted research ve- 
hicle (RPRV) [ 5 ] ,  the highly maneuverable air- 
craft technology (HIMAT) vehicle [6,7,8,9], and 
the advanced fighter technology integration pro- 
gram AFTI /F - l6  [lo,  111, t o  the X-29 forward- 
swept wing aircraft. The result of this evolving, 
hands-on development of qualification and V&V 
methodologies is a practical approach tha t  maxi- 
mizes safety and allows system qualification, verifi- 
cation, and validation t o  proceed in an expeditious 
and resource-effective manner. 
The V&V methodology used a t  Ames-Dryden 
is the same methodology tha t  has actually been 
used for all flight-critical control systems i n  non- 
commercial aeronautical flight vehicles, including 
the If-18, Space Shuttle, and B-1 airciaft. This 
methodology uses a subset of the V&V techniques 
in use or advocated within the aeronautics coni- 
munity. The  larger issues of certification and 
the validation of highly reliable, fault-tolerant 
systems have been of lesser concern than those 
of qualifying and conducting flight validation of 
flight-critical systems. 
The  basic methodology for the V 8 V  of coli- 
ventional operation-critical systcins is directly ap- 
plicable to  the V&V of IiDSs. 111 fact, if IilISs 
are to  be used in operation-critical applications. 
the qualification of these I<l3Ss will have to bc 
PRECEDING PAGE BLANK NOT FILMED 
107 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19890010461 2020-03-20T04:08:29+00:00Z
performed within the context of established pro- 
cedures and will have to address the require- 
ments placed upon the qualification of conven- 
tional operation-critical systems. Thus, i t  is essen- 
tial tha t  the main features of this well-established 
V&V methodology be understood. 
NOMENCLATURE 
normal acceleration, g 
altitude, ft 
altitude rate,  ft/sec 
altitude acceleration, ft/sec2 
functional relationship between k and a, 
aerodynamic gain 
proportional path gain 
integral pa th  gain 
equivalent longitudinal stick command 
difference between desired and actual 
representation of integrator in Laplace 
a1 ti t  ude 
variable notation 
Abbreviations and Acronyms 
AFSR 
AFT1 
AI 
Ames-dry den 
CCB 
CCR 
CDR 
DFI3W 
DR 
F R R  
HiMAT 
KBS 
P C  
PDR 
RPRV 
QA 
SDR 
airworthiness and flight safety 
advanced fighter technology 
artificial intelligence 
Dryden Flight Research Facility 
of the NASA Ames Research 
Center 
review 
integration 
configuration control board 
configuration change request 
critical design review 
digital fly- by- wire 
discrepancy report 
flight readiness review 
highly maneuverable aircraft 
knowledge-based system 
program change (software) 
preliminary design review 
remotely piloted research 
quality assurance 
system design review 
technology 
vehicle 
STR 
V&V 
wo 
D e f i n i t i o n s  
system test report 
verification and validation 
work order (hardware) 
The majority of the following definitions is 
taken verbatim from Szalai and others (41. 
cer t i f ica t ion  The  determination by a regula- 
tory authority tha t  a product meets the regula- 
tions for tha t  product. 
e m b e d d e d  system A system tha t  is an inte- 
gral part  of some larger system. This distinction 
is particularly important when a subsystem inter- 
acts with the larger system in such a way tha t  a 
failure in the embedded system can propagate to  
the larger system or cause the larger system t o  fail. 
f a u l t  t o l e r a n t  A system which is able t o  con- 
tinue t o  provide critical functions after the occur- 
rence of a fault. 
flight critical A component or  system whose 
failure could cause loss of the aircraft. 
miss ion  c r i t i ca l  A component or system 
whose failure could result in the inability t o  per- 
form a mission. 
o p e r a t i o n  critical A component or system 
whose failure could result in loss of the aircraft, 
loss of life or limb, compromise public safety, result 
in substantial financial loss, or inability to  perform 
a mission. 
qua l i f ica t ion  A formal process whereby a sys- 
tem or aircraft is defined to  be ready for flight 
operations. 
system An entity of fixed identity united by 
some form of purpose, interaction, or interdepen- 
dence tha t  can be meaningfully isolated. 
va l ida t ion  The determination tha t  a result- 
ing product meets the objectives tha t  led to  the 
specification for the product. This determination 
usually includes operation in a real environment. 
ver i f ica t ion  The determination tha t  a design 
meets the specification. Verification is usually a 
par t  of the validation process. A simulated envi- 
ronment is often used. 
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2 A METHODOLOGY FOR 
CONVENTIONAL, 
EMBEDDED 
CONTROL SYSTEMS 
FLIGHT-CRITICAL 
The basis of the  Ames-Dryden flight qualifi- 
cation and V&V methodology for embedded flight- 
critical systems is the incremental verification of 
system components, integration testing, configu- 
ration management, and  flight validation. T h e  
application of the verification, integration testing, 
and flight validation is discussed within the  overall 
context of the system life cycle. The configuration 
management aspect of the qualification and V&V 
methodology is discussed separately. 
2.1 Verification, Validation, and the 
Systeiii Life Cycle 
Verification and validation is a n  ongoing pro- 
cess tha t  is an integral par t  of the system life cycle. 
The  system life cycle for conventional flight con- 
trol systems js often characterized as a series of 
stages (figure 1).  
When functional specifications are derived 
from the  system goals and requirements, those 
specifications must be critically examined to  es- 
tablish t h a t  the  specifications adequately address 
the system goals and requirements. Similarly, 
the design specifications must meet the functional 
specifications. This critical examination is accom- 
plished by system design reviews (SDRs), prelim- 
inary design reviews (PDRs), and critical design 
reviews (CDRs). The  SDR is a presentation and 
review of the conceptual design of the  system; the 
goals and requirements are  addressed and top-level 
definition of functional specifications are provided. 
The  purpose of the  SDR is to ensure tha t  the un- 
derstanding of the goals and requirements for the 
system is consistent between the requesters and 
designers. The  P D R  is a presentation of a first- 
order definition of the system design including a 
presentation of how the  functional specifications 
are being addressed in the design. The CDR is a 
detailed design review in which a functional design 
is presented for review. (Theoretically, no hard- 
ware or software is to be  implemented until after 
the CDR, but  in practice, system components are 
implemented early in the life cycle, often before 
the SDR, t o  test ideas and may be directly incor- 
porated or modified for the system as finally im- 
plemented.) At each of these reviews, designs are 
presented to  a large audience with broad interests 
ensuring tha t  system-level goals and requirements 
are addressed, user requirements are  satisfied, and 
safety issues are adequately considered. The re- 
view boards provide detailed feedback t o  the sys- 
tem designers and implementers, and weaknesses 
or criticisms raised a t  a design review must be ad- 
dressed at the next level of review. 
The design review process is a n  iterative, and, 
one hopes, convergent process in which the goals 
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Figure 1 .  Ames-Dryden Life Cycle for Research Systems 
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and requirements and functional specifications are 
interpreted and translated into a design specifica- 
tion tha t ,  among other things, establishes a par- 
titioning of functions between hardware and soft- 
ware. Design specifications for both hardware and 
software are translations of the functional speci- 
fications which in turn  embody the system-level 
goals and requirements. The  design specification 
is supported by a n  interface definition establish- 
ing both the  interfaces between the system and its 
environment and the interfaces between the hard- 
ware and software. 
The  design specifications are  transformed into 
hardware and software realizations. This transfor- 
mation is not a straightforward, one-step process. 
The transformation of a design specification t o  an 
implemented prototype system requires the devel- 
opment and testing of numerous software proce- 
dures and hardware circuits, each of which is a 
prototype of some element in the larger system. 
The implementation of system elements or 
components is supported by a variety of analysis 
tools and testing techniques [ 1 , 2 , 4 , 1 2 , 1 3 ] .  The 
analysis tools used include failure modes and ef- 
fects analysis, independent review, static verifica- 
tion, independent calculations, conjectures, and 
suspicions. This analysis is conducted on abstract 
models of the system or  of the system compo- 
nents. Linear system models, aggregate system 
models, block diagrams, flow diagrams, schemat- 
ics, source programs, specifications, and simula- 
tions are  some of the main abstract models used. 
This analysis of abstract  models is used t o  trans- 
late requirement and design specifications into a 
physical realization. 
The  physical realization of a system is con- 
structed from physical realizations of system com- 
ponents such as circuits, microprocessors, comput- 
ers, and software modules. Hardware components 
are often breadboard, brassboard, or nonflight- 
qualified versions of the actual flight system; these 
hardware components are  bench tested in isolation 
and then incorporated into “hot-bench’’ test fa- 
cilities tha t  incorporate other simulated or actual 
physical systems. Typical of these hot-bench test 
facilities are simulations incorporating flight hard- 
ware (hardware-in-the-loop simulations) [G, 7,8] or 
iron bird facilities based on extensive replication 
of flight systems and are often based on the  use of 
decommissioned aircraft [4]. 
Simulation testing provides a closed-loop fa- 
cility wherein the  system is exposed t o  a n  envi- 
ronment tha t  closely resembles the  electronic and 
d a t a  environment in which the system must actu- 
ally operate. Simulation also provides a facility for 
testing tha t  the hardware and software of the sys- 
tem are integrated and operating together. The 
realism of the simulation is determined by the op- 
erating requirements for the flight application of 
the system (see section 2.3) .  Simulation is where 
the pilot ( the system user) is first exposed to  and 
allowed to  evaluate the system. 
This analysis, testing, and verification along 
with the configuration management process (see 
section 2 .2 )  constitute main components of the 
qualification process wherein a system is deter- 
mined t o  be  ready for flight test. These results 
are presented t o  a flight readiness review (FRR) 
team composed of nonproject engineers from mul- 
tiple engineering disciplines who perform an inde- 
pendent and in-depth review of the system design, 
analysis, test results, and configuration manage- 
ment. The F R R  team is empowered to recom- 
mend additional analysis, testing, or documenta- 
tion. The  results of the FRR are presented a t  
a n  airworthiness and flight safety review (AFSR) 
panel where the project team seeking authoriza- 
tion for approval t o  begin flight testing responds 
t o  the findings of the  FRR. The  AFSR panel is 
typically composed of engineering and operations 
managers and flight safety personnel. Only after 
the AFSR is satisfied is a system taken to  flight. 
Flight validation is a n  extension of the test- 
ing methods performed on physical models in the 
simulation. For a research system, the flight tested 
component is a physical model of itself; if the sys- 
tem is t o  be fielded in an operational environment, 
the flight tested system is often a prototype of the 
final system. During flight test, the system is ex- 
posed to  the total  physical, electronic, and da ta  
environment in which it is designed to  operate. 
Gault and otliers [I] ,  IIolt and others 1121, and 
Jiopkins [I31 propose the use of additional abstract 
models (aggregate models) and analysis methods 
(formal proofs and statistical analysis). These 
models and analysis tools address one of tlie chief 
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limitations in the  Ames-Dryden methodology: the 
reliance on testing, both failure modes and effects 
and nominal condition testing. This becomes a se- 
rious concern when considering either highly reli- 
able, fault-tolerant systems or highly complex sys- 
tems. Hartmann and others [13] describe the  num- 
ber of tests required for such systems as a fund@ 
mental problem: 
T h e  fundamental problem of fault toler- 
ance validation is the  vast number of test 
cases when all possible combinations of 
flight conditions and multiple faults are 
considered. 
This view is confirmed by Gerhart and others [l], 
Holt and others [12], and Gerhart [15], who claim 
tha t  exhaustive testing is not possible for any but 
the simplest of systems. 
2.2 Configuration Management 
Configuration management is the orderly and 
systematic process of ensuring consistency in de- 
velopment, documentation, testing, problem re- 
porting, and maintanance of a system. The use of 
a configuration control board (CCB) with review 
and change approval authority, consisting of repre- 
sentatives from several engineering disciplines, is 
a key feature of configuration management. Pe- 
tersen and Flores [16] describe the configuration 
management process: 
The  primary purpose of the software 
control and system configuration man- 
agement process for flight-critical digi- 
ta l  flight control systems is to  provide a 
method for efficient flight system devel- 
opment and a procedure for assuring safe 
flight operations. The process is designed 
to control system configuration changes 
by managing the primary system devel- 
opment phases . . . and t o  resolve dis- 
crepancies uncovered during system test- 
ing. In addition, the configuration coli- 
trol process prescribes stringent test and 
documentation requirements and pro- 
vides for visibility of changes across all 
involved engineering disciplines through 
formal review procedures. 
Petersen and Flores [16] also present block dia- 
grams showing the steps in the software control 
and system configuration process (figure 2) and 
the documentation flow and tracking process (fig- 
ure 3) used a t  Ames-Dryden. This process is ini- 
tiated when the  system is pu t  under configuration 
control which is generally well into the system de- 
velopment cycle. 
Figure 2 shows how new system requirements 
or anomalous system behavior are accommodated 
in the software control and system configuration 
management process. New system requirements 
are introduced into the  configuration manage- 
ment process using a configuration change request 
(CCR); anomalous system behavior is recorded on 
a discrepancy report (DR) (figure 3). 
The  use of DRs t o  record any anomalous be- 
havior is useful for identifying and correcting prob- 
lems tha t  result from operator error, initializa- 
tion, or system design. Additionally, the extensive 
use of DRs provides a means of isolating incipi- 
ent problems by identifying areas or functions in 
the system tha t  are repeatedly involved in or as- 
sociated with anomalous behavior. Tracking DRs 
also facilitates one aspect of the process of build- 
ing confidence in the system (see section 2.1): it 
provides a means of judging the maturity of a sys- 
tem through experience with tha t  system over an 
extended period. Typical experience with systems 
as a function of time is shown in figures 4 and 5.  
It is important t o  note tha t  the problems 
identified in every DR cannot be or are not al- 
ways remedied. A problem tha t  occurs in a test 
facility might be highly unlikely in flight; the sub- 
ject of a DR might even be based on a rethinking 
of the system design tha t  uncovers a failure mode 
or potential problem. Program schedule slippage 
or the costs of fixing the  problem are often over- 
riding concerns. The effect of problems identified 
in DRs is evaluated in terms of the risk associ- 
ated with them. Those known problems tha t  are 
identified on DRs and not remedied are called “ac- 
cepted risks.” Accepted risks are always clearly 
identified before flight testing. The  risks associ- 
ated with these problems are made visible to, and 
are evaluated by, independent reviewers sucli as 
those comprising the AFSR panel (see section 2.1). 
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2.3 System Criticality and Its Impact 
on Validation 
The requirements imposed on the  V&V and 
configuration management process are determined 
by the  criticality of the  system. For aircraft flight 
systems, three levels of criticality are generally 
recognized: 
A. Systems whose failure could cause loss of life 
or limb, compromise public safety, o r  result in 
substantial financial loss; 
I). Systems whose failure could cause mission 
failure (mission-critical); 
C. Systems whose failure could cause inaccurate 
results or inefficient use of resources. 
The  level of criticality of a system is primarily de- 
termined by those requesting tha t  the system be 
developed. IIowever, system designers or any of 
the  independent review teams can modify that  de- 
termination. In practice, we have found that  it is 
Total 
system 
2ooo operating 
lime, hr 
0 
8388 
usually easier and less work to  classify a system 
as a level B rather than  t ry  t o  support and de- 
fend a classification a t  level C. Nontechnical fac- 
tors are often taken into account when determin- 
ing a t  which level t o  class a system. A system 
might be treated at level A when tha t  system or 
the project of which it is a part  is highly visible 
and any perceived problem might jeopardize re- 
search goals. 
The  configuration management process in- 
creases in formality a t  each higher level of criti- 
cality: the  composition of the  CCB is broader and 
consists of more members, the  requirements for 
documentation increase, and testing requirements 
for system changes are more extensive. The  re- 
quirements for the  simulation also increase with 
higher levels of criticality: a level C system might 
be qualified off-line, using interactive or batch sim- 
ulations and stand-alone hardware tests; a level I) 
system requires a t  least a real-time, piloted simu- 
lation for closed-loop testing; and a level A system 
generally requires a hardware-in-the-loop simula- 
tion or an  iron bird. 
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3 APPLICATION OF 
VALIDATION 
METHODOLOGY TO 
SYSTEMS 
KNOWLEDGE-BASED 
The  V&V methodology used for conven- 
tional, embedded operation-critical flight systems 
provides an established and accepted set of pro- 
cedures upon which a methodology for KBSs can 
be based. While this position may be controver- 
sial in t h e  AI community, the  political and socio- 
logical realities of flight research and testing will 
ultimately dictate t h a t  any methodology for the 
validation of KBSs a t  least address the currently 
used methodology for conventional systems. 
3.1 The Life Cycle Model for 
Knowledge-Based Systems 
T h e  proposed approach to  the V&V of KBSs 
relies on the life cycle model shown in figure 1. The 
life cycle model for a KBS has been a topic of con- 
siderable concern t o  some who have addressed the 
validation of a KBS, and several models have been 
proposed [17,18,19]. These models stress the de- 
velopment and prototyping process in a KBS. The 
motivation for developing these models is appar- 
ently t o  address the lack of a clear or well-defined 
statement of system goals and requirements and t o  
highlight the  prototyping process common in the 
development of KBSs. While the proponents of 
these models would probably contend tha t  there 
is a fundamental difference between the life cycle 
of a KBS and a conventional system, another view 
is t h a t  this apparent difference is more reflective 
of the  maturi ty  of KBSs rather than of anything 
fundamental. 
Because KBSs are  just  emerging in operation- 
critical applications, there is little certainty of ca- 
pabilities and limitations of these systems. The 
prototyping tha t  is a common feature in the de- 
velopment of a KBS often represents an at tempt  
t o  establish requirements for a given application. 
This definition of requirements, capabilities, and 
limitations through prototyping is not unlike that 
used in conventional systems when new teclr~riques 
or a.pplications are  a t tempted.  The  difference is 
in the body of knowledge and experience behind 
the  use of conventional systems as opposed t o  tha t  
for KBSs. Also reflected in this prototyping is 
the lack of maturity of artificial intelligence (AI) 
techniques in general tha t  provides little basis for 
the selection of control and knowledge representa- 
tion methods. 
3.2 Problems in the Verification and 
Validation of Knowledge-Based 
Systems 
There are several issues t h a t  are almost cer- 
tain to  create problems for anyone attempting 
to validate operation-critical KBSs. Perhaps the 
most serious of these is an unwillingness t o  treat 
the current generation of KBSs out  of the con- 
text of the promises of AI. The  current generation 
of KBSs are not, in general, capable of learning 
or even modestly adaptive. These systems exhibit 
few nondeterministic properties. These KBSs may 
be complex but  they are not unpredictable. But so 
long as there is this persistence in dwelling on the 
ultimate potential of AI systems instead of on the 
realities of the system being qualified, i t  is unlikely 
t h a t  an AFSR panel would allow flight testing. 
A further difficulty arises from the contention 
tha t  I<BSs d o  not always produce the correct an- 
swer. If this is t rue then a KBS can only be 
used for tasks in which their performance can 
be monitored and overridden by a human. hlost 
operation-critical systems are required to  perform 
without human intervention or with only high- 
level supervision or control. However, a KBS tha t  
does not always produce the optimum answer is 
acceptable as long as it never produces a wrong 
answer. This latter point is in fact one of the 
main V&V issues: operation-critical systems must 
be shown to always produce acceptable solutions. 
3.3 A Proposed Approach to De- 
velop a Verification and Valida- 
tion Methodology for Knowledge- 
Based Systems 
In order to  validate a system, one must have 
a set of requirements for that system, and thosc. 
requiremeiits must est ablislr the perforiirance rri- 
teria and the liniitations of the systciii. The cur- 
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rent claim from some within the AI community 
tha t  many of the characteristics of AI systems pre- 
clude such requirements either do not understand 
the validation issue or  are unwilting to  accept the 
structure and formalism required for validation. 
To address the issue of requirements, a n  incremen- 
tal  approach t o  validating KBSs is needed. 
There are two key aspects of the proposed ap- 
proach to  the V&V of KBSs: 
1. development of a KBS to  perform some task 
t h a t  is well-known, well-understood, and for 
which conventional V&V techniques are ade- 
quate; and 
2. incrementally and simultaneously expand 
both the KBS and the V&V techniques to  
more demanding and complex tasks. 
T h e  procedures used for verifying, qualifying, and 
validating conventional operation-critical flight 
systems a t  Ames-Dryden will be applied and mod- 
ified as required. Because we ultimately plan t o  
carry these experiments to  flight using the rapid- 
prototyping facility [20], this process will be per- 
formed under the aegis of the AFSR panel and 
will be under periodic review. The  subject of this 
research will be a KBS tha t  is being developed 
to perform aircraft maneuvers normally performed 
by highly trained pilots. 
The  research plan is to  identify maneuvers of 
increasing difficulty and t o  build gradually more 
complex and adaptive KBS to  accomplish those 
maneuvers. This will include prototyping, evalu- 
ation, and a series of initial operating capabilities 
Control system 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - , I n 
tha t  will evolve into a sequence of documented 
requirements for testing against each version of 
the system. This approach fits well within the 
model of and practice used with conventional digi- 
tal  systems. 
4 VALIDATING A SIMPLE 
SYSTEM 
KNOWLEDGE-BASED 
To illustrate the proposed approach to  the 
V&V of KBSs, a rule-based longitudinal altitude- 
command autopilot example for a n  F-15 aircraft 
will be presented. The example presented repre- 
sents a single axis of a three-axis (longitudinal, 
lateral-directional, and velocity axes) controller. 
This controller is being developed and will he qual- 
ified as a mission-critical system (see section 2.3) 
as part of the research into validation methodolo- 
gies for operation-critical KBSs. 
4.1 Goals and Requirements for 
Example Knowledge-Based 
System 
A simplified representation of the aircraft and 
control system is shown in figure 6.  The  objective 
is to  develop and t o  demonstrate a knowledge- 
based controller tha t  produces command inputs 
to the aircraft control system based on a dynamic 
world model obtained from instruments on the air- 
craft and on a simple set of rules. While this task 
I 
may not represent a suitable application of a KBS 
(because i t  is easily performed by conventional 
algorithmic control laws), i t  provides a simple 
mission-critical application tha t  is both easy to  
understand and easy to validate. 
The  control task requires the autopilot system 
(whether based on conventional algorithms or a 
knowledge-based approach) t o  produce commands 
tha t  cause the  measured aircraft altitude h to be 
within some specified tolerance A h  of the com- 
manded altitude h,,,. Additionally, constraints 
are placed on the  altitude ra te  h and the nor- 
mal acceleration a,. T h e  constraint on a, is the 
same as a constraint on altitude acceleration h, 
but  a, represents a more easily understood and 
easily measured physical quantity. 
The  initial requirement for this controller was 
tha t  i t  control the aircraft in a consistent, repeat- 
able manner at least as well as a pilot during both 
the transition mode (going from one altitude t o  
another) and the altitude-hold mode (controlling 
the  aircraft about  a specified altitude). T h e  de- 
sire was t o  have it control the aircraft as well as a 
conventional algorithmic autopilot. An additional 
goal was t o  allow off-condition engagement so tha t  
the controller would be effective even without be- 
nign initial (engagement) conditions. 
These goals and requirements are similar t o  
those initially imposed on the altitude-hold capa- 
bilities of the  flight test maneuver autopilot for 
the HiMAT vehicle [21]. The  constraints and tol- 
erances were established as baseline figures. From 
this initial specification, a rule-based system was 
implemented tha t  combined numeric and symbolic 
methods. This initial system was tested using a 
detailed nonlinear simulation model of the aircraft 
and its control system; the  controller achieved ex- 
cellent results for some initial conditions but per- 
formed poorly for many others.  This  initial result 
was typical of tha t  experienced when evaluating 
the initial implementation of a conventional con- 
troller on a nonlinear simulation. After several it- 
erations of this process, a fairly detailed statement 
of performance capabilities and limitations was es- 
tablished (table I). This information, in essence, 
represents a clarification of the statement of goals 
and requirements, serves as the basis of a func- 
tional specification for the system, and defines the 
system test matrix. 
4.2 Life Cycle of Example Knowledge- 
Based System 
By this point in the life cycle, the develop- 
ment of a conventional controller would be sup- 
ported by design and analysis tools and abstract 
(linear) models of not only the aircraft and its con- 
trol system but  of the controller as well. These 
tools and models would provide some of the basis 
of the validation of a conventional system by es- 
tablishing metrics of system performance and ro- 
bustness. The  main benefit of having such tools 
and models is tha t  their use allows extensive test- 
ing with a minimum of computational expense; 
only selected test points need t o  be repeated us- 
ing the nonlinear simulation. For the rule-based 
controller, tools and analysis techniques either do 
not exist or are rudimentary a t  best. This differ- 
ence in development will create some difficulties 
in qualifying the system for flight. Par t s  of the 
problem are both technical and sociological. Veri- 
fication will have t o  rely on more extensive testing 
and a thorough exposition of the nature of the 
rules. The testing will require tha t  a large num- 
ber of tests be conducted on the nonlinear simula- 
tion tha t  extends the time required for conducting 
those tests. 
Table I. System 
Performance Capabilities 
and Engagement Conditions 
Defined by Prototyping 
Performance requirements 
A h  = f 50 ft 
h,,, = f 100 ft/sec 
anpo, = 2.0 g 
anneo = 0.5 g 
Enaacement conditions 
A h  = f c o f t  
h,,, = f 200 ft/sec 
a, = f 2.0 g 
The  next step in the life cycle is an SDR. 
This has been conducted informally during de- 
velopment but now requires formal exposure and 
review. The rules derived from prototyping (ta- 
ble 11) and a detailed definition of the verification 
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test matr ix  will be presented and reviewed a t  the 
SDR. Again, this addresses both the technical and 
sociological aspects of V&V: the  SDR provides a 
technical assessment of the  design, allowing the 
completeness and consistency of the rules t o  be 
examined by independent reviewers and serves as 
a gentle introduction t o  the idea of using KBSs in 
such applications. 
Table 11. Rules for Longitudinal Altitude-Hold 
Autopilot 
Performance boundary rules* 
If the altitude acceleration exceeds the 
positive acceleration limit, move stick 
forward. 
If the altitude acceleration exceeds the 
negative acceleration limit, move stick aft. 
If the predicted altitude ra te  exceeds the 
positive altitude rate limit, trim stick 
forward. 
If the  predicted altitude ra te  exceeds the 
negative altitude ra te  limit, trim stick aft. 
Normal command rules* 
0 If the altitude error is positive and the 
predicted altitude ra te  is negative, trim 
stick aft. 
0 If the altitude error is negative and the 
predicted altitude ra te  is positive, trim 
stick forward. 
If the  predicted altitude error is positive 
and the altitude error is small, click stick 
forward. 
0 If the  predicted altitude error is negative 
and the altitude error is small, click 
stick aft. 
0 If the predicted altitude error is positive 
and the altitude error is large, trim 
stick forward. 
0 If the predicted altitude error is negative 
and the altitude error is large, trim 
stick aft. 
*Definitions: 
move large movement of stick 
trim intermediate movement of stick 
click small movement of stick 
It  is expected tha t  the development of this 
rule-based controller will continue through the 
normal life cycle for research systems. The  main 
differences tha t  are expected between conventional 
and 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
KBSs are  tha t  for the KBS 
the design reviews will serve both educational 
and technical purposes; 
the design will incorporate more problem spe- 
cific experience (but probably less fundamen- 
tal system understanding) a t  each stage in the 
life cycle; 
the lack of traditional tools and abstract mod- 
els will force earlier recognition and definition 
of system testing requirements; and 
because of the lack of tools and abstract mod- 
els, the  testing required for the rule-based 
system will be more extensive than tha t  re- 
quired for a conventional system of similar 
capabilities. 
4.3 Test Matrix for Example 
Knowledge-Based System 
To appreciate the number of individual tests 
tha t  must be performed as par t  of the validation 
of this longitudinal autopilot, two factors must be 
understood: 
1. the performance and limitations define a ma- 
trix of test conditions for each simulated flight 
condition; and,  
2. because the dynamics of a n  aircraft vary 
throughout its flight envelope, tha t  matrix of 
test points must be repeated a t  many flight 
conditions. 
The performance requirements and engage- 
ment conditions define the requirements for both 
on- and off-condition operation. To test the 011- 
condition requirements for the example autopilot, 
one engages the system a t  the test altitude and 
hlach number and monitors the performance of 
the system to  ensure tha t  none of the performance 
limits are  exceeded. The testing of engagement 
requirements requires a set of tests about each of 
the altitude and hlach number points. Thus. for a 
given altitude and hlach numlwr, tlic systcin inust 
be engaged a t  a number of conditions repicsrntiug 
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the  permutations of the bounds of the engagement 
conditions; again, time histories are monitored t o  
ensure t h a t  t h e  system performs within the  Lim- 
its established by the  performance requirements. 
At each altitude and Mach number test condition, 
this requires a minimum of eight separate tests. 
The  dynamics of a n  aircraft are not constant 
throughout the  flight envelope. To ensure tha t  the 
system performance goals are  met, tests must be 
performed at a number of flight conditions (fig- 
ure 7 ) .  At each altitude and Mach number con- 
dition, the entire matrix of performance require- 
ments must be tested at the engagement limits. 
r 
Altitude 1 V X X X X X  
8197 
Mach 
Figure 7. Typical Flight Envelope W i t h  Ex- 
ample Test  Condit ions 
This testing is time consuming and requires 
a detailed nonlinear simulation. A conventional 
system would require less simulation testing on 
the nonlinear simulation because i t  would be sup- 
ported by abstract  models of the aircraft and the 
autopilot. The  nonlinear simulation would be used 
a t  a few selected altitude and Mach number con- 
ditions t o  verify the abstract models. 
It is important  to  note t h a t  the  testing de- 
scribed above 
1. includes no failure condition testing, 
2. the example autopilot is a greatly simplified 
representation of a system tha t  will be taken 
to  flight, and 
3. the  rules presented in table I1 represent only 
a single axis of a three-axis controller. 
5 LIMITATIONS OF 
VALIDATION 
METHODOLOGY FOR 
SYSTEMS 
KNOWLEDGE-BASED 
The most serious limitation of applying the 
V&V methodology for conventional systems to  
operation-critical KBSs is the lack of both struc- 
tured development methods and verification tools 
and techniques. Conventional systems are sup- 
ported by design and analysis tools and tech- 
niques, coding standards, and methods for exam- 
ining software tha t  is procedural in nature. These 
tools, standards, and procedures do not exist for 
KBSs nor are any likely to  emerge in the near 
term. Another limitation of applying the conven- 
tional V&V methodology t o  KBSs is tha t  compo- 
nent testing is difficult if not impossible. Both of 
these limitations will force validation t o  rely on 
integrated system testing, treating the total  KBS 
as a black box. 
The testing requirements for a system do not 
increase linearly with the complexity of the sys- 
tem; testing requirements grow as a polynomial 
or exponential function of system complexity. As 
a simple example of the growth of the test ma- 
trix with system complexity, consider the test ma- 
trix defined for the longitudinal autopilot (see sec- 
tion 4.3). A similar matrix would be defined for 
each axis of the total autopilot. If we assume that 
there are m tests required for each axis, then the 
final autopilot will have three axes of comparable 
complexity; the total number of tests will be m3 
because all combinations of tests will have to  be 
performed a t  each flight condition to validate the 
system performance. 
Testing any but the most simple s y s t e m  as 
black bows requires a test matr ix  of overwhelm- 
ing coniplcxity. This will compound an  already se- 
vere problem tha t  has been a consistent factor i n  
tlic VSrV of convcntioiial systems: tlic cost, sclicd- 
ule, and personncl requirements for VkV greatly 
cxccrd the developiiient costs and almost always 
cause prograinniatic delays. Further, the costs ant1 
delays arc dircctly Irlatcd to how Lite, i n  tlic (IC>.- 
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velopment cycle, design and implementation errors 
are detected. 
One of the  main challenges of developing a 
validation methodology for KBSs is t o  develop 
tools and techniques tha t  will allow highly com- 
plex systems to  be verified, qualified for flight, 
and validated in a cost-effective and timely man- 
ner rvithout having t o  reduce the  capability or 
operational envelope of t ha t  system. (This chal- 
lenge, incidentally, is one that  those working with 
conventional systems must also face.) As part  of 
the Ames-Dryden effort in developing and demon- 
strating a viable validation methodology for KDSs, 
the development of automatic testing systems is an 
integral part .  The  goal of this effort is t o  gener- 
a te  test matrices automatically from requirements 
and specifications for use in an automated test- 
ing system capable of both conducting tests and 
monitoring and interpreting test results. 
6 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The qualification, verification, a n d  valida- 
tion methodology used a t  Ames-Dryden for flight- 
critical control systems and how this methodol- 
ogy can be extended and applied to  intrlligent 
knowledge-based systems are reviewed in this pa- 
per. The justification for the use of this method- 
ology is the similarity of the current generation 
of KDSs with conventional systems i n  terms of 
complexity and function. Liniitations of t,he pro- 
posed methodology for both highly reliahle, fault- 
tolerant systems and extremely complex systems 
such as might be envisioned for future generations 
of KDSs are discussed. Research and developmcnt 
areas are suggested to augment and enhance the 
current methodology to  support both conventional 
systems as well as KBSs. 
The  main differences between convc.ntiona1 
systems and KIISs are that  for the latter 
1. the design reviews will serve bot11 educational 
and technical purposes, 
2. the design will iricorporatcx inore p r o l ~ l ~ i i r -  
specific experimce (biit prot~ibly lvss furitla- 
mental system uiiderstanding) at ciarli stag(, 
in the life cycle, 
3. the lack of traditional tools and abstract  mod- 
els will force earlier recognition and definition 
of system testing requirements, and 
4. because of the lack of tools and abstract mod- 
els, the  testing required for the  rule-based 
system will be more extensive than that  re- 
quired for a conventional system of similar 
capabilities. 
The  view presented in this paper is consistent 
Lvith that proposed in Gault and others [l]: 
A validation methodology for such sys- 
tems [ultrahigh reliability, fault-tolerant 
systems] must be based on a judicious 
combination of logic01 proofs, analytical 
modeling, and experimental  testing. 
This methodology must be supported by reliable, 
validated development and test tools that  lower 
the cost and reduce the schedule, if the goal of val- 
idation is t o  be achieved for either highly reliable, 
fault-tolerant systems or highly complex systems 
such as are envisioned for KBSs. 
Perhaps the biggest obstacle in the qualifica- 
tion of operation-critical KDSs is the mystification 
and obfuscation by the advocates and developers 
of KBSs. \\'bile stressing the enormous differences 
between KBSs and conventional systems may be 
a useful tactic i n  generating enthusiasm and sup- 
port for the development and use of KBSs, this 
approach is almost guaranteed to  discourage ac- 
crptance and prevent deployment of these systems 
i n  operation-critical applications. 
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